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Much has been written recently about the fantastic expansion of
multinational corporations as one of the most important vehicles
promoting the internationalization of the world's economy. The
figures are familiar; the names and size of some of the largest
corporations are well-known; and numerous analysts, journalists
and ideologues have done their best to provide us with arguments
regarding the impact and implications of these corporations on
both host and parent states. Consequently, it is not necessary to
repeat these figures or the changes or justifications emerging from
these discussions. Instead, I would like to turn immediately to the
question of the consequences of these firms for workers and their
trade unions. More narrowly, after a short introduction, this
article seeks to examine some of the legal and non-legal regu-
latory schemes which have been advanced as mechanisms by which
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labor unions might be able to achieve their objectives regarding
the control of multinational enterprises. Within this general con-
cern, the paper focuses on international, regional and foreign ef-
forts to establish regulations, purposefully neglecting American
labor's support of the Burke-Hartke bill about which so much has
been written already. However, before beginning this effort, one
caveat is in order. I am not a lawyer and as will be seen do not
approach the subject from the perspective of a lawyer. The in-
formation upon which much of this article is based has been ob-
tained from a close monitoring and analysis of trade union docu-
ments and from extensive interviews conducted with international
and non-American trade union officials during the past several
years. Thus, forewarned, the editors of the San Diego Law Review
and the readers themselves assume complete responsibility for
reading further.
Among all the statistics offered regarding the size of multina-
tional corporate activity, the area least stressed is that of world-
wide employment. However, it stands to reason that extensive
direct foreign investment results in many workers being employed
by foreign headquartered multinational corporations. Unfortu-
nately, though, there are no readily available aggregate statistics
to show the amount of employment generated by multinational
enterprises around the world. A hint of the size of this employ-
ment is provided by data collected by the International Metal-
workers' Federation (IMF) for twenty-seven major multinational
electrical and electronic companies and twelve major international
automobile manufacturers.' In the former industry, the firms em-
ployed 3,940,833 persons and in the latter 2,401,223 with the per
firm averages being 109,000 employees in the electrical industry
and slightly more than 200,000 workers in the auto industry.
Breakdowns are not generally available regarding the percentage
of the work force employed by foreign subsidiaries, but suffice it to
say that for a number of firms, foreign employment comprises
more than a third of their total workforce. Representative com-
panies in this category would be Ford, General Motors, Philips,
Nestle, Proctor and Gamble, International Telephone and Tele-
graph (IT&T), International Business Machines and, of course,
many others.
1. Computed from data found in Benedict, Trade Union Strategies on
Multinational Companies: Notes on Report of Daniel Benedict, (Paper
presented to the Conference on Multi-National Corporations, Newcastle,
Northern Ireland, May 31-June 2, 1971). Data reported previously in
Blake, Trade Unions and the Challenge of the Multinational Corporation,
403 ANNAr~s 35 (1972).
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From the point of view of the host countries, the importance of
foreign direct investment in such fields as chemicals, vehicular
manufacturing, electrical machinery and office equipment means
that in certain industries and for specific industrial unions asso-
ciated with these industries the foreign employer component is of
a critical size. As an example, a report of 1967 employment pat-
terns in the Belgian metalworking industry revealed that 35 per
cent of all workers in this industry were employed by foreign-
headquartered multinational corporations. 2 It is readily under-
standable why the president of Belgium's largest metalworking
union is so concerned about the multinationals and their impact on
labor.
THE CONCERNS OF LABOR
In several other articles,3 I have discussed some of the concerns
of host country trade unions regarding their relationships with
multinational corporations, but perhaps a brief review is in order.
One of the major functions of trade unions is to protect and ad-
vance the interests of their members through interaction with
management and appropriate governmental bodies. Trade union
officials feel quite strongly that their ability to pursue successfully
these functions is somewhat reduced because of the international
nature of the employer. From the union perspective, top manage-
ment, the place where important decisions are made, goals estab-
lished and standards set, is located in some foreign country in a
headquarters which is physically, psychologically, culturally and
politically distant from the subsidiary in the host country.4 As a
2. Commission Speciale pour l'Etude des Problemes Relatifs a l'In-
dustrie des Fabrications Metalliques, Rapport sur les Investissements dans
l'Industrie des Fabrications Metalliques (Brussels, Belgium: Secretariat,
Conseil Professional du Metal, June 1969), p. 19.
3. See the following: Blake, Corporate Structure and International
Unionism, COL. J. W. Bus. 19-26 (1972); Blake, The Internationalization of
Industrial Relations, 3 J. INT'L Bus. SUxIES 17-32 (1972); and Blake, Trade
Unions and the Challenge of the Multinational Corporation, 403 ANxALS,
34-45 (1972).
4. Management protests this view, arguing instead that subsidiary
management is thie locus of decision-making power. A recent study I
undertook indicates that international executives of large American multi-
nationals feel that the involvement of headquarters in industrial relations
activities at the subsidiary level is very rare on such things as local con-
tract administration, subsidiary grievance procedure, and general relations
result of these factors, and others, it is exceptionally difficult for
a trade union, essentially limited in influence and membership to
one state, to have the ability to exert effective pressure on a man-
agement which is essentially beyond the union's reach in another
country.
Moreover, the large size and international nature of the multina-
tional employer means that management may be able to absorb
pressures and even strikes directed toward one particular subsidi-
ary with very little harm to the whole corporation. Other facilities
and profit centers located around the world will continue to work
largely unaffected by the industrial dispute. ,Consequently, the
corporation is not as susceptible to the various influence tactics in
the arsenal of the trade union. In contrast, a solely domestic man-
ufacturer is likely to feel more sharply the various pressures
mounted by a union and may well be more responsive to the union
demands. Furthermore, the existence of multiple facilities in sev-
eral different countries may allow the multinational corporation to
shift production in a way which insures the continuous servicing
of important markets and production processes. Again, the do-
mestic manufacturer is not able to do this.
Trade union officials are also concerned about the ability of
multinational corporations to shut down operations in one state
regardless of the cost to the host state work force or economy.
These rather basic investment decisions and their consequences
for job security are also thought to be more difficult to influence
when an international firm is involved. What makes matters even
more irritating is the feeling that management of multinational
firms act purposefully or clumsily in ways which are quite con-
trary to established procedures and practices. Questions of union
recognition and consultation, employment practices and work rules
are frequently cited by union officials as the type of issues where
multinational corporations are prone to try to introduce new prac-
tices or are unaware of the established industrial customs and tra-
ditions.
Trade union officials also feel that their ability to develop sound
and factually supported arguments for bargaining with multina-
tional corporations is hindered by the difficulty of obtaining ap-
propriate financial information. Consolidated accounts, transfer
pricing, and cost and profit allocations among subsidiaries often
mean that the true financial structure of a particular subsidiary is
with unions. However, by their own admission, headquarters is much
more frequently involved in collective bargaining issues and the settle-
ment of strikes.
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not only hidden from the unions but also arranged in a fashion to
support the corporate point of view in industrial relations and tax
matters. Consequently, union officials support vigorously efforts
to require full and fair disclosure of corporate financial informa-
tion.
Then, too, and finally in this brief examination, trade union offi-
cials join with many others in the host state to express concern
about the economic, social, cultural and political power wielded by
the multinational enterprises and the consequences for the host
state. As such, the trade unions are voicing an opinion for which
there is much popular support and, of course, many potential allies
for future actions regarding international enterprises.
UNION COUNTERSTRATEGIES
Before examining in some depth regulation as a possible union
counterstrategy to the challenges posed by multinational corpora-
tions, brief consideration of other types of union responses may be
useful in terms of providing a general perspective for the succeed-
ing discussion. One approach adopted by union organizations at
the national, regional and international levels involves what I have
called elsewhere union strengthening. Essentially, union strength-
ening activities are designed to build up the strength and the abili-
ties of the unions and their officials in their confrontations with
multinational management. Consequently, organizational drives
to recruit more members at the work place, educational activities
to convey to members the seriousness and pervasiveness of the
problems engendered by multinational enterprises, and training
programs to help union officials become more effective spokesmen
and negotiators are undertaken by all types of union organiza-
tions.
National industrial unions are the focus of these activities be-
cause it is at this level that the conflict between labor and man-
agement is joined. However, they receive extensive support from
their national comprehensive unions like the AFL-CIO and the
Trades Union Congress (TUC) in the United Kingdom and also
from the industrially organized International Trade Secretariats
(ITS).5 For example, the IMF has organized numerous "travel-
5. The International Trade Secretariats are somewhat equivalent to but
ing" seminars in Latin America and Asia which seek to upgrade
the skills and knowledge of local union officials about multina-
tional corporations in a specific industry.
Union strengthening has also involved attempts to consolidate
different unions or reduce ruinous competition among rival union
organizations at the national level. Inter-union conflict stemming
from religious, ideological, historical and trade differences are be-
ing reduced in a number of countries such as Italy, Japan, Mexico
and the Netherlands with the result that employers are confronted
with a more united and therefore stronger union adversary. Some-
times these efforts are undertaken primarily by the competing un-
ions themselves, but in other cases the help of a third party union
organization at the national or international level has beei found
to be useful.
The union strengthening activities discussed above will certainly
aid the unions in their confrontations with both domestic and in-
ternational employers. However a large, united and committed
membership supporting a skilled and able leadership will be an ef-
fective front-line actor in conflicts with multinational corporations.
After all, with very few exceptions, much of the contest between
management and union takes place at the subsidiary to national
industrial union level.
A second type of union response to the challenges of the multi-
national corporation involves cross-national cooperative activities
among unions from several different countries. This has been
examined at some length in other articles, and while it is the most
difficult of the three types of counter measures to implement, it is
also potentially the most important one with wide-ranging impli-
cations for industrial relations and international interactions.6
There are three different types of cross-national cooperation; in-
formation exchange, consultation, and inter-union coordination.
An analysis of such activities indicates that they have occurred
with just about equal frequency during the last five years.
not necessarily affiliated with the International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions (ICFTU). The communist counterparts are called Trade
Union Internationals (TUI), and the confessional, largely Catholic coun-
terparts, are Trade Internationals (TI). However, the ITS are most active
regarding multinational corporations because so many of their affiliates
are in states where these enterprises exist.
6. In addition to my articles cited above, see my "Cross-National Co-
operative Strategies: Union Response to the MNCs," presented at the
Multinational Corporations and Labour Unions Symposium organized by
the Peace Research Centre of the Catholic University, Nigmegen, The
Netherlands, May 1973, forthcoming in proceedings of the conference.
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Information exchange involves efforts to collect and disseminate
information about multinational employers which is thought to
have some potential use for national unions in their struggle with
management. The information collected may be concerned with
such matters as wage rates, fringe benefits, working conditions,
collective bargaining practices and agreements or specific develop-
ments which may be helpful to know in labor's representation ef-
forts. Management is certainly aware of what is happening with
its various subsidiaries, and where unions do not have similar in-
formation their effectiveness can only be lessened. Consequently,
both ad hoc and permanent and institutionalized efforts at infor-
mation exchange have been developed by union organizations at
all levels. A few ITS have been very active in organizing the sys-
tematic collection and dissemination of data for their affiliates.
Another type of cross-national cooperative strategy is consul-
tation or the meeting of union officials from several different
countries to exchange views on problems, to provide a basis for
joint action in the future, or to plan for such actions. Again the
objective of this activity is cooperation leading to a stronger union
presence in relations with a specific multinational firm. Some of
the ITS have established world company councils which period-
ically bring together labor representatives from the subsidiaries of
large multinational enterprises. This has occurred particularly
with respect to firms engaged in automotive manufacturing, elec-
trical machinery and the chemical industry.
The third type of cross-national cooperative activity has been
termed inter-union coordination, where unions from different
countries coordinate their efforts regarding a specific firm. Un-
like the first two categories, the actions here are more likely to be
ad hoc in nature as opposed to continuing institutionalized efforts.
This reflects the fear on the part of many national union leaders
of becoming so deeply involved in a relationship with unions from
other countries that it inhibits their freedom of action. This con-
cern is fostered by feelings of distrust, suspicion, and awareness of
great differences among the union movements of different coun-
tries. While there are several forms of inter-union coordination,
solidarity actions are overwhelmingly the most prevalent. Cross-
national solidarity means that a union in conflict with a multina-
tional employer is aided by unions associated with the same firm
but in different countries. Solidarity may take the form of mone-
tary support, pressure on local subsidiaries or headquarters, sym-
pathy strikes, refusal to work overtime to make up the lost pro-
duction caused by a work stoppage elsewhere and other similar ac-
tivities. The objective, then, of inter-union coordination is to uti-
lize the strength and efforts of a number of unions associated
with different country subsidiaries in support of the objectives of
another union. Consequently, the corporation is faced with a more
multinational union adversary than without such coordination.
Having provided some basic background material regarding the
nature of the multinational corporate challenge and the response
of trade unions, it is now appropriate to begin an examination of
the third type of union strategy-regulation and restriction of the
multinational corporation.
REGULATIONS AND CODES OF CONDUCT
In beginning this section of the article, it is appropriate to indi-
cate that there are very few examples of concrete and compre-
hensive regulatory schemes either existing or proposed. However,
it is instructive to discuss what is being considered by various
union and non-union organizations as it relates to the protection
and advancement of worker and trade union interests with respect
to the multinational corporation. First to be considered will be
the efforts of union organizations at the national, regional and in-
ternational levels to develop regulatory schemes. This will be fol-
lowed by a discussion of the implications of proposals advanced
by various non-union related organizations. In addition to report-
ing upon various developments in these areas, a subjective assess-
ment based on extensive interviews with foreign and international
union officials will be offered regarding the amount of union
leader support for these efforts as well as the prospects for success.
Trade unions in many countries have traditionally turned to
their national governments in their struggles with employers. In
addition to enacting favorable social legislation, government has
also been sought as an ally by unions because of its ability to enact
measures which protect the interests of workers and unions in
confrontations with management. Because of these functions of
government and the successes unions have had in influencing gov-
ernmental actions, particularly in Europe, it is quite natural for
many union officials to seek government's help in facing the chal-
lenges of the multinational corporations. However, in dealing with
international enterprises, a critical question is at what level such
regulation should be enacted and is obtainable. For example, it
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is not at all clear what international organization is the appro-
priate mechanism for developing and enforcing an international
set of rules prescribing the conduct of multinational corporations.
Consequently, union organizations have advanced proposals to seek
national, bilateral, regional and/or international control of these
enterprises.
Issues
Union efforts to obtain governmental aid in their struggles with
multinational corporations have concentrated on a number of spe-
cific issues. Unions are striving for governmental regulations
which will insure that multinational corporations abide by exist-
ing industrial relations customs and practices in various states,
particularly those concerning job security. In addition to the pro-
tection of fringe benefits, patterns of operations and consultation
relationships, many European union officials are particularly both-
ered by the thought that out of ignorance or design the manage-
ment of these firms often seems to be insensitive to the need to
provide employment security for workers. Decisions to layoff
workers or close down operations appear to be made too cavalierly,
whereas domestic firms are seen as far more concerned about the
implications of such actions. The famous, or infamous, examples
of the lay-offs by General Motors and Remington Rand in France
in 1962 are well known by European union officials and each can
add other instances where similar moves were undertaken by for-
eign firms in their states. Several officials interviewed expressed
the desire for laws which would require corporations to forewarn
and consult with the union prior to decisions to reduce, change or
eliminate production.
Another important problem mentioned by most union officers
involves the refusal of some multinational corporations to recog-
nize and deal with trade union organizations. A survey by the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) re-
vealed that International Business Machines, Kodak, Gillette, Cater-
pillar Tractor, Nestle, Air Canada, and a number of other American
and non-American firms were guilty of refusing to recognize unions.
Consequently, regulations designed to require recognition of trade
unions and their rights and privileges are principal objectives sought
through pressures on governments to impose restrictions. It should
be pointed out, though, that union recognition is not a universal
occurrence in many states even by domestically owned and man-
aged firms. Indeed, some union leaders in the Netherlands, Bel-
gium, France and Great Britain have suggested that the smaller,
often family-owned operation exhibits more resistance to unioni-
zation of the workers than the international enterprises. How-
ever, the multinational corporation tended to employ many more
workers, was highly visible, and as a result, set a bad example
or precedent where recognition was resisted.
In addition to the general problem of trade union rights, regula-
tions were felt to be necessary to overcome the reluctance on the
part of many international firms to accept the unionization of
white-collar employees. Many firms, particularly United States-
based ones, have little or no domestic experience with unionized
clerical and professional help, and even though such a practice
may be widely accepted in the host country environment, great
resistance is often exhibited by the foreign firm.
Another problem associated with the very existence of unions,
which is the subject of pressures for regulation, is concerned with
the status of unions and union recognition in less developed coun-
tries where there is not a strong tradition of industrial unionism.
Multinational corporations are often accused of deliberate union-
busting strategies in their operations in less-developed countries,
and sometimes host country governments are partners-whether
willingly or not.7 Such practices are obviously decried by unions
in the host country, but strong and vociferous complaints also
emerge from unions in the more advanced industrial states which
hold such actions to be a mechanism enabling firms to transfer
production to a cheaper and unfettered labor market without ef-
fective unions. Governmental prohibition of such negative corpo-
rate policies is therefore pursued by various union organizations.
The specification by governments of requirements with respect
to a variety of intra-company trading and financial practices is
also an objective of many unions. Among other things, transfer-
pricing, tax payment strategies, dividend expatriation and finan-
cial reporting customs need to be controlled by government regu-
lation according to many union leaders. It is generally thought by
union leaders that the various and limited financial accounting
and reporting practices of states allow multinational corporations
7. An example of this is South Korea where the government has pro-
hibited strikes against the subsidiaries of foreign corporations because
of its desire to attract increasing amounts of foreign investment.
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to engage in financial manipulations that obscure the appropriate
facts for the needs of the union. Thus, unions feel that govern-
mental control of such practices is necessary.
Demands for the establishment of precise and consistent rules
for financial reporting are also frequently linked to the more na-
tionalistic and immensely popular concerns over the nature of the
impact of such firms on host country plans, objectives and policies.
These too are supported by many union leaders.
Host Government Arrangements
Union efforts to seek more formal and legal controls over multi-
national corporations are focused upon a number of different gov-
ernmental bodies. One thrust is directed toward the host coun-
tries which are recipients of direct foreign investments. The ob-
jective is to establish rules of good conduct or regulations which
must be subscribed to by any foreign firm with operations in the
state. A number of national unions have initiated efforts to pres-
sure their governments in this direction, particularly in Germany
and the United Kingdom. In Australia, the Labor Party Confer-
ence recently passed a resolution urging studies to be undertaken
of the impacts of these enterprises with subsequent regulation a
possibility. The ICFTU and several international trade secretari-
ats have also supported activities of this sort, and indeed this tactic
was felt to be the most appropriate move by a majority of the na-
tional union officials interviewed. Other national and international
union leaders have expressed sympathy for these pressuring activ-
ities, but a number have also exhibited doubt and cynicism about
the chances for meeting with success.
The specific nature of the controls varies somewhat and in most
cases are ill-defined in terms of content and particularly proce-
dure. However, recognition of trade unions, acceptance of prevail-
ing industrial relations practices, corporate sensitivity to and un-
ion-management consultation on job security and production deci-
sions, and appropriate financial reporting were the most frequent
subject areas proposed for host government control.
Understandably, national unions prefer to seek regulations from
their own states since they are experienced in such interest rep-
resentation activities and have achieved some successes in the past.
Their own members and fellow unionists may well wield an im-
portant degree of political power. However, some union leaders
are well aware that by approaching the problem on a state-by-
state basis further problems are raised. Stringent controls im-
posed on multinational corporations in one state can often be easily
circumvented by transferring existing or directing future invest-
ment to another state not similarly hampered by regulations.
Consequently, the national union movement which successfully
establishes rules or guidelines may suffer from loss of current
and future investment and, therefore, employment to other coun-
tries where similar constraints on the enterprises do not exist.
In essence, the work forces of various countries are competing
against each other for jobs. This problem is particularly acute for
unions when their state is part of a common market since multi-
national corporations may find it as easy to serve the broader
market from one state as another. The content of national regula-
tions could be a deciding factor in a firm's investment location
decision.
To overcome this problem, common market arrangements them-
selves could harmonize labor laws to ensure that advantages at the
expense of labor were not achieved. The European Economic Com-
munity is considering the adoption of common rules regarding, for
example, employment and dismissal practices, but any such action
appears to be a long way off.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to gather information about the ex-
istence of governmental rules or regulations designed to aid unions
in their relations with multinational corporations, but exhaustive
investigation of various reports and publications concerning Eu-
ropean labor law indicates that this tactic has not been pursued
vigorously or with much success. It is instructive to observe that
the report on multinational companies submitted to the ICFTU
World Economic Conference in June, 1971, offered, as the only ex-
ample of host state guidelines for multinational enterprises, the
"Guiding Principles of Good Corporate Behavior for Subsidiances
in Canada of Foreign Companies." None of the twelve principles
are in the least concerned with the treatment of Canadian unions
and labor, though Principle 9 does urge "a Canadian outlook within
management." Union efforts in European countries are not note-
worthy either by their objectives, their efforts or their successes.
While a few more officials from European national unions ex-
pressed interest in obtaining government restrictions, it seems that
only the DGB of Germany and the TUC in the United Kingdom
were conscientiously seeking governmental regulations. Most of
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the officials associated with other European unions indicated that
their organizations were not actively pursuing such controls, and
some were very skeptical of efforts to do so. The TUC, though,
has called for union pressure to obtain legislation which will re-
quire multinational corporations to disclose more financial infor-
mation and to act responsibly in industrial relations matters. The
DGB is seeking to obtain government assurances that agreements
with foreign investors do not undermine existing trade union
rights.
A variation of the more formal, universally applicable type of
regulation within a state involves the negotiation of rules of con-
duct for a specific multinational corporation which establishes op-
erations in a state. For instance, interested Belgian unions were
able to move the government to require Westinghouse Electric
Corporation to agree to a set of conditions regarding labor and
employment matters prior to the approval by the government of
the acquisition of ACEC, the large Belgian electrical equipment
manufacturer, by the Pittsburgh based firm.
Bilateral Arrangements
Some union organizations, including the ICFTU, have suggested
that bilateral agreements between capital exporting and capital
importing states be arranged to regulate and monitor the activities
of multinational corporations. In addition to the extreme diffi-
culty of achieving such agreements particularly with the United
States, this tactic does not alleviate the problem of competition
with other states not party to similar bilateral agreements. This
tactic was not at all popular with most of the union officials inter-
viewed.
Parent Country Regulatory Arrangements
Legal regulation of multinational corporations can also be under-
taken by the parent country of the firm, the capital exporting na-
tion. By having guidelines imposed at the source of multinational
enterprises, the problem of competition among potential host states
and their work forces may be diminished or eliminated. In its
place, there will probably emerge claims of "unfair" competition
between corporations from various parent countries. If the capital
exporting nations establish different sets of rules which their firms
must follow, it is likely that those firms which feel disadvantaged
as a result of having to operate under a more onerous set of guide-
lines will attempt to have their severity reduced. In other words,
unless the regulation of all the capital exporting countries are
similar in content and remain so, competition among multinational
enterprises and their headquarter countries will lead to an in-
evitable watering-down of guidelines. Another possibility is that
multinational corporations will formally be chartered in small and
sympathetic countries willing to offer regulations havens, and
therefore, for legal purposes, abandoning the erstwhile parent coun-
try. An analogy exists in the shipping industry where a number
of ships owned by United States citizens are formally and legally
registered in Panama or Liberia. Similarly, some countries are
offering tax shelters presenting companies -with the opportunity
to escape onerous parent country taxes. Thus, for several reasons,
regulations by capital exporting countries will be difficult to
achieve in a meaningful sense unless there is widespread agree-
ment and acceptance of the rules. Even then the existence of ref-
uge states like the Netherlands, Antilles or Panama may make pos-
sible successful evasion by the "stateless" multinational corpora-
tion.
While efforts of this sort seem unlikely in the long run without
coordination among capital exporting states, there does exist a reg-
ulatory scheme similar to this is Sweden. Swedish firms which
apply for Swedish government guarantees for investments in a few
developing countries are required to meet a set of specified social
conditions, some of which are specifically concerned with worker
and trade union rights. It is important to note, however, that
these guidelines are relevant only to Swedish foreign investment
in some few developing countries; the vast amount of investment
in the more advanced industrial states is unencumbered by these
or similar rules. The guidelines established are certainly the most
detailed and precise regulatory effort heretofore introduced, 'and
as shall be discussed shortly, they are far more specific than the
general calls for regulation initiated by the ICFTU and various
international trade secretariats. Therefore, because of their inher-
ent importance and their potential as a model for other regulatory





1. The Swedish investment guarantee system seeks to further
development objectives. It is therefore selective. Guarantees are
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given only for investments in the countries given priority for
public aid; only investments which are expected to add to the
economic development of the host country may be guaranteed.
The developmental effect criterion is elaborated upon in one re-
spect which is vital from a Swedish viewpoint: according to the
preparatory work for the legislation, the company in the host
country must give its employees satisfactory working and em-
ployment conditions and must show a positive attitude towards
union activities.
2. In this memo an attempt is made to specify these "social
conditions". The memo is based on ideas and suggestions pro-
duced by representatives from wage earners' organisations and
companies in a working party organised by the Swedish Export
Credits Guarantee Board (EKN), which is charged with the ad-
ministration of the Swedish investment guarantee scheme.
3. Social conditions can be attached to a guarantee only if the
investor is able to exert sufficient influence on the activities of
the foreign company. Influence does not necessarily mean that
the investor has a majority interest in the foreign company. The
investor may instead gain sufficient control over the foreign com-
pany's administration through a management agreement.
The Meaning of the Social Conditions
4. The social conditions can be divided into two groups: (1) "be-
havioural conditions" concerning specific action required by the
company in favour of its employees.
Behavioural Conditions
5. First among the behavioural conditions is a general require-
ment on the company not to encourage discrimination in employ-
ment, promotion or work distribution. When considering the is-
sue of discrimination it will be taken into account that foreigners
("expatriates") usually have higher salaries than local employees
with similar jobs. When it comes to the employment of indige-
nous staff, social attitudes will make it necessary to apply the
non-discrimination principle with caution. The company should,
however, as far as practicable, try to break existing discrimination
patterns which counteract economic and social development.
6. Other behavioural conditions relate to the attitude towards
trade union activities. The foreign company should, with due re-
gard to the host country's legislation as well as to national and
international practice:
(i) recognise trade unions created by the employees;
(ii) let union officers exercise normal union functions;
(iii) disclose wage statistics before negotiations;
(iv) enter into collective bargaining agreements according to
country's rules;
(v) give the unions notice of lay-offs and facilitate the read-
justment of workers laid off;
(vi) cooperate towards a peaceful solution of disputes with
unions.
The practical application of these rules will vary greatly already
within the circle of countries receiving Swedish aid. The inde-
pendence allowed for union organisations varies from one country
to another. Differences exist, concerning the central organisa-
tion's position and its relations to the Government, the relation-
ship between the central organisation and its affiliated unions,
procedures to establish wages, the scope of the collective bar-
gaining agreements, and the rules for behaviour during strikes or
lockouts. Other differences may concern rules and practices for
the acknowledgement by the company of a local union, the pos-
sibility of collecting union fees through deductions from wages,
etc. These differences mean that the behavioural condition as to
attitude towards trade unions may have different meanings in dif-
ferent countries. The rules must be interpreted with due regard
to their purpose of encouraging the employees' efforts to influence
wages and unemployment conditions through union activities.
Benefit conditions




8. The training category includes all activities aiming to increase
the employees' skill and experience in order to (1) increase their
productivity, and (2) make possible a quick transfer of tasks from
foreign specialists to local personnel.
9. Social security means benefits to employees through legisla-
tion, agreement and/or the company's general employment condi-
tions regarding compensation during illness, injuries at work, lay-
offs and retirement because of age. All these benefits have in
common the aim to reduce the risk that the employee or his
family will suffer economic distress if he loses his wages.
10. Social welfare means measures supplementary to wages and
social security which tend to improve health, nutrition and cul-
tural standards, such as:
(a) measures to help employees find suitable housing;
(b) measures to keep those who work and/or live within the
company area in good health;
(c) measures to make it possible for the employee to keep a
good nutritional standard; and
(d) measures to provide libraries, meeting premises, training
and entertainment so as to facilitate the workers' adjust-
ment to a new environment.
11. The investor will be expected to conduct investigations and
present plans on the above type of measures which are required
according to the host country's laws, and to describe whatever
additional measures he plans to take in favour of the foreign com-
pany's employees. On the basis of this information, negotiations
between the applicant and EKN will determine what specific
measures will be considered conditions for the guarantee.
12. In these negotiations EKN will take the following factors into
account.
Knowledge should be obtained of ILO recommendations and
conventions on the subject under discussion as well as of the host
country's attitude. Any requirements must be in harmony with
the legislation of the host country and with practices generally
prevailing there. It is also necessary to adjust requirements in
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relation to the type of production, its geographical location, and
its size. Social welfare conditions are, for example, essentially dif-
ferent for a small workshop industry in a town and for a plant
to utilise natural resources in a sparsely populated area of the
country. Finally the time aspect must be considered. It is not
necessary that the desired measures be taken immediately in con-
nection with the establishment of the foreign company. Em-
ployment and working conditions should gradually improve during
the guarantee period to keep pace with the development of the
company and of the host country. The purpose of EKN's nego-
tiation activities should be to contribute to employment and work-
ing conditions in the foreign company in a manner consistent
with the host country's enlightened self-interest.
13. In order to help in determining issues relating to the above
paragraphs, the Swedish International Development Authority
(SIDA) has declared itself prepared to make investigations de-
scribing the employment and social conditions in the relevant
countries. These investigations will be based on material from
ILO and other national and international sources. They will, in
particular, compare these conditions with international practice.
International and Regional Arrangements
Thus far, our discussion of efforts to regulate the actions of mul-
tinational corporations with respect to labor and union relations
with management has been concerned with rules established by
host or parent countries. As has been mentioned, one of the more
severe problems associated with such a tactic is the fact that one
state by imposing guidelines may disadvantage itself as a recipient
of foreign investment on the one hand or injure its own multi-
national firms and its position as an exporter of investments on
the other hand. One method of avoiding this problem is to de-
velop regional or international mechanisms to regulate multina-
tional corporations. A number of union organizations at all levels
have called for international control of the enterprises, but admit-
tedly concrete proposals much less concrete progress have not
been made.
At the international level, the ICFTU has urged the adoption of
codes of conduct for multinational corporations which would be
internationally developed, administered and enforced. The report
of the 1971 ICFTU World Economic Conference suggested that an
international convention be convened by various U.N. agencies,
the International Labor Organization (ILO), General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) to propose a set of regula-
tions and to establish an international body to oversee compliance
with the rules. Of primary interest to the recent convention is
regulation in matters such as:
... observance of established industrial relations procedures (ILO
standards), manpower planning, industrial concentration and merg-
ers especially conglomerates, intra-company trading and financial
practices, and their policies on research, tax liability and dividend
remittance as well as the obligation to publish global balance
sheets together with financial accounts for all their individual
subsidiaries.8
In addition, the ICFTU has mentioned specifically the desirability
of an international conference or agreement subscribing to the ILO
Conventions number 87 and 98 which relate to freedom of associa-
tion and rights of organization and collective bargaining. More
precisely, Convention 87 affirms the right of workers and employ-
ers to establish and join organizations of their choosing for further-
ing and defending their interests without interference from public
law or authority. Convention 98 more pointedly prohibits acts cal-
culated to force a worker not to join a union as a condition of work
'and condemns practices which seek to punish or prejudice workers
engaging in union activities. Furthermore, both employer and
workers organizations are not to interfere with each other's activi-
ties and particularly, company unions are deemed to be unaccep-
table. Convention 98 also urges the establishment of conditions
which encourage and promote voluntary collective negotiations be-
tween employers associations and unions with respect to the terms
of employment.
While the ICFTU has recommended that international guide-
lines for multinational corporations be developed, it has not trans-
lated its general plan into specific recommendations. A well-de-
fined set of proposals on an international regulatory agency and for
the content of potential regulations has not been presented by the
ICFTU. Instead, ICFTU activity in this area seems to have pro-
gressed no further than appearances before many forums which
call for the development of guidelines and control, and suggestions
for further research on various issues of concern. Certainly in
terms of spreading its point of view, ICFTU officials have been
active, appearing before national congresses of affiliates, the vari-
ous meetings of international trade secretariats, academic and
study groups sponsored by universities and research institutions,
and policy-making bodies of states including Mr. Maier's testimony
before the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the Joint
Economic Committee of the United States Congress. However,
8. 1971 ICFTU World Economic Conference Reports No. 2, The Multi-
national Challenge 59 (1971).
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the message has usually been the same: "An international confer-
ence should be called to adopt regulations to control multinational
corporations and to establish an international agency to enforce
and administer the guidelines." Specifics with respect to proce-
dures or content have not been offered.
While some other union organizations at the national and inter-
national levels are generally supportive of the ICFTU objectives,
most union officials interviewed were highly skeptical about the
likelihood of success in this area. Indeed, there was little confi-
dence expressed in the ICFTU activities by other international un-
ion officials and even less support among national union officers.
This general reaction of doubt towards ICFTU activities is caused
by a number of complex matters, but suffice it to say that ICFTU
efforts to achieve international control have remained largely at
the level of generalities and largely unsupported by fellow trade
unionists. While support for the ICFTU is lacking, trade union
leaders do feel that legal aid of this type, while an attractive ob-
jective, is not a realistic hope in the short run. Furthermore,
with only three or four exceptions of the total interviewed, they
are most doubtful that the ICFTU can contribute much to this ef-
fort at the present time.
Greater faith and hope is placed in the efforts of the ILO to de-
velop some meaningful guidelines or regulations for multinational
corporations. However, the slowness and conservative nature of
the tripartite structure of the ILO, where labor, government and
employers are represented equally, suggests that the interests of
labor on this controversial subject will not be pursued as fervently
as labor might wish. Indeed, many of the labor officials inter-
viewed recognized these tendencies and expressed great reserva-
tions about the ability of the ILO to come up with anything with
much substance.
In 1971, labor representatives were first able to get the ILO to
agree that the impact of multinational corporations deserved con-
sideration and study by the organization. The International Labor
Office (the permanent secretariat of the ILO) prepared a working
paper for the use of a committee of experts which met in October
and November of 1972.9 The results of this meeting are actually
9. International Labour Office, Multinational Enterprises and Social
Policy (1973).
quite typical of the ILO again because of the necessity of achieving
a degree of consensus among the three types of members of the
ILO. The committee of experts recommended that the Office un-
dertake extensive studies concerning the impact of multinational
corporations on matters of social policy, particularly as they differ
from the actions of strictly national firms. To facilitate these ef-
forts, governments are urged to improve their collection of statis-
tics in this area, and employers and workers are encouraged to co-
operate in whatever way possible. Also, the experts recommended
that the Office study the usefulness of developing international
principles and guidelines in the field of social policy and the multi-
national enterprises. If this latter study indicates that such guide-
lines would be useful, then action should be undertaken to estab-
lish a set of principles. Incidentally, financial support for these
studies has been provided in the 1974-75 budget.
This, then, is as far as the 1LO has progressed toward the devel-
opment of international standards for multinational corporations
regarding employment and labor issues. Furthermore, the time
horizon suggests that it will be at least two or three more years
before the ILO is even ready to begin hammering out the precise
content of these guidelines. Even then, because of the necessity
of compromise, it is doubtful that the principles will provide the
protection and aid desired by trade union officials. Instead, they
will probably be rather general statements of good conduct lack-
ing, of course, any enforcement mechanism. However, it may be
that by raising these issues in the ILO a legitimacy and "rightness"
will accrue to the recommendations which will proceed to have
some affect on the actions of multinational enterprises. It is my
feeling, though, that the principles eventually arrived at will gen-
erally be well within the scope of the actions and policies of most
of the leading multinational enterprises.
While trade union leaders have little confidence in the efforts of
the ICFTU and have fewer but still substantial reservations about
the ability of the ILO to get the job done, they are often enthusi-
astic supporters of and believers in efforts to build regional codes
of appropriate multinational corporation behavior with respect to
labor and trade unions. In Europe, particularly the Common Mar-
ket countries, there is some national union backing for the devel-
opment of Common Market standards, and in addition there exists
appropriate labor union and governmental machinery to pursue
the objective. However, as mentioned earlier, progress is ex-
tremely slow. The European Confederation of Free Trade Unions
(ECFTU), representing the ICFTU affiliates in the Community, is
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one of the more highly developed regional union organizations,
and it considers as one of its major tasks the representation of
trade union interests to the Commission and to the Council of Min-
isters of the Community. Additionally, there has recently been
formed the European Federation of Trade Unions which encom-
passes more countries than those in the Common Market and which
cuts across old ideological and confessional lines. The role of this
organization is in the process of being formulated, but how it will
affect efforts to establish a European code of conduct is not at all
clear. Somewhat more is known about the ECFTU.
Each year the ECFTU has three meetings with the EEC Com-
mission during which time presentations are made and problems
are discussed. In addition, there are as many, or more, formal con-
sultations with the appropriate EEC Ministers. Of course, less for-
mal lobbying-type activities are also pursued on a continuing basis.
Thus, the mechanisms for influence do exist.
In the area of regulation and control, the ECFTU has been con-
cerned primarily with the role of unions in the various European
Company proposals, but it has also presented recommendations to
the Commission and to the Council of Ministers regarding multi-
national corporations in general. On this latter point, the ECFTU
has sought the establishment of rules which will protect workers
in case of acquisitions or mergers. More specifically, the ECFTU
wishes to insure that change of ownership or corporate form will
not lead to rejection of or adjustment in existing collective bar-
gaining agreements at the various plants and facilities of the ex-
panded corporation. Additionally, preliminary consultation be-
tween management and unions has been proposed whenever there
is a possibility of the transfer of production or instability of em-
ployment. Also as might be expected, the ECFTU has urged upon
the Commission the necessity of the publication of appropriate fi-
nancial and employment data. While the ECFTU has not been
successful in having these suggestions accepted and implemented,
the problem has been deemed to be serious enough to warrant the
creation of an expert group within the Commission which is
charged to look into the problems posed by mergers and acquisi-
tions by multinational corporations and to develop concrete pro-
posals which are then to be submitted to the Council of Ministers,
the organization of employers, and representatives of employees.
The process is agonizingly slow, and a recent conversation with an
EEC official indicates that little is happening.
While the ECFTU has been somewhat active with respect to the
impact of multinational corporations on labor, they generally de-
fer to the ICFTU and other union organizations on this matter.
Instead, the ECFTU is currently interested in development of a
European Company law and the relationship of unions to these
new enterprises. While this question is of major importance, it is
also an exceptionally difficult one for the ECFTU because of the
varying orientations and philosophies of its member unions.
Worker participation in management or co-determination as it re-
lates to a European Company is a complex issue because of the
very different conceptions of the work force's relation to manage-
ment. For instance, the Dutch and Germans are fervent believers
in worker participation, but in practice the nature of participation
is quite different in the two countries. The French viewpoint is
not compatible with the Dutch or German, and the Belgian unions
do not support the concept of worker participation. On this ques-
tion, then, the position of the ECFTU is a delicate one. Neverthe-
less, the ECFTU did recommend to the Commission of the EEC
that the membership of the Comit6 de Surveillance (somewhat
analogous to a board of directors) be comprised of workers, share-
holders and representatives of the public in equal proportions.
This plan was turned down in favor of one which gave the work-
ers one third of the membership and the shareholders two thirds.
The point is that the ECFTU, in spite of internal problems, has
taken an active role in attempting to shape the nature of the Eu-
ropean Company.
Further evidence of this is the ECFTU proposal that for each
European Company a Committee of Trade Union Representatives
be established which will be composed of union representatives
from each of the firm's factories. This committee would meet reg-
ularly with the management of the firm to discuss various prob-
lems.
With respect to the imposition of rules or guidelines on multina-
tional corporations, the ECFTU pictures itself as an organization
whose purpose is to represent the interests of trade unions in the
deliberations, policies and procedures of the European Economic
Community. The scope of its activities are therefore largely lim-
ited to the EEC, and as the Common Market expands it is likely
that the importance of the ECFTU will also expand unless it is
largely supplanted by the emerging EFTU. The ECFTU has been
interested in establishing Common Market controls over non-Eu-
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ropean multinational corporations, but it feels itself better able to
seek through the Common Market Commission and the Council
of Ministers the creation of a European Company charter that will
incorporate the interests and rights of trade unions and workers.
By accepting its limited range of concern, it is clear that the
ECFTU does not plan to confront in a major way the problems pre-
sented by non-European international enterprises. However, this
apparent weakness may be its source of strength in comparison to
the broad international approach of the ICFTU. The latter seems
to be lacking significant support at the national union level for its
efforts. On the other hand, the ECFTU does have some support,
although neither total nor overwhelming, for its more narrowly
defined activities. The interviews revealed that even though Eu-
ropean union officials recognized the international nature of man-
agement they are more comfortable thinking about European strat-
egies than about international plans. Indeed, a good number still
prefer to limit their concern to seeking political and administrative
protection within their particular state.
The OECD has also evidenced some concern about the impact of
multinational corporations on industrial relations and has hosted
several conferences at which this topic has been 'examined. The
Trade Union Advisory Committee to the OECD has a continuing
input into the deliberations of the OECD, but again little seems
to be happening. The Rey report, Policy Perspective for Inter-
national Trade and Economic Relations, urged that the OECD
study various consequences of multinational enterprises and held
out the possibility that it might be necessary and possible to de-
velop principles of behavior for the companies.10 Labor policy is
just one of many issues identified by this report.
At the same time, studies regarding the multinational corpora-
tions are being pursued both by the Economic and Social Council
and the United Nations Committee for Trade and Development,
but neither group seems destined to produce a set of regulations
which will be particularly useful for labor in its struggles with
these firms. Also at a recent meeting with the OECD, a group of
trade union economists agreed to introduce in the forthcoming
10. Report by the High Level Group on Trade and Related Problems
to the Secretary-General of OECD, Policy Perspectives for International
Trade and Economic Relations 66 (1972).
GATT negotiations a provision calling for the safeguarding of in-
come and employment for workers affected by shifts in interna-
tional trade patterns dominated by multinational corporations.
Another will be introduced on the issue of fair labor standards.
The preceding discussion should indicate to the reader that the
development of international or regional rules and regulations gov-
erning the behavior of multinational corporations is a long, tor-
tuous way off. Most assuredly, there is movement, but much of
it seems to be unfocused and repetitive of other studies. Add to
this the slowness with which the international and regional organi-
zations act and the great need for compromise and conservatism
based on the necessity of achieving the lowest common denomi-
nator for agreement, the prospects are not very encouraging. Also,
meaningful enforcement power is absent from most of these organ-
izations. While some trade union officials are quite hopeful of fa-
vorable developments at the regional level, fewer at the interna-
tional level, a great majority feel that such guidelines would be
nice but that the labor movement cannot afford to wait for them
or rely upon them. Consequently, prime emphasis is placed upon
developing strategies which can be pursued by the unions them-
selves.
Non-Governmental Codes of Conduct
This skepticism on the part of most union officials can also be
applied to the recommendations advanced by various private and
non-governmental groups concerning the behavior of multina-
tional corporations. The Council of the International Chamber of
Commerce in its November, 1972, meeting adopted Guidelines for
International Investment. As stated in the introduction, the
Guidelines are not presented as a rigid code of conduct but they
are "a set of practical recommendations based upon experience,
designed to facilitate consultation between investors and govern-
ments and to promote a better understanding of each other's needs
and objectives."'" It is useful to discuss briefly the aspects of the
code of particular interest to labor. In addition to recommending
that the investor provide relevant and asked-for information about
its business and a clause which asks the respect of the national
laws, policies and economic and social objectives of the host coun-
try, the matters of concern to labor are located in part VI, Labour
Policies. Instead of merely paraphrasing the clauses, this section
is reproduced for the reader.
11. International Chamber of Commerce, Guidelines for International
Investment 5 (1972).
SAN DIEGO LAW PEVIEW
GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
VI. LABOUR POLICIES
1. The investor
a) Should make the maximum practicable use of qualified local
personnel.
b) Should co-operate with the host government, labour un-
ions and local educational and vocational training institu-
tions in programs for the upgrading and training of local
labour.
c) Should, to the extent consistent with the efficient operation
of the enterprise, take into account the host government's
efforts to create employment opportunities in the localities
where they are most needed.
d) Should, in all matters directly affecting the interests of la-
bour, to the extent appropriate to local circumstances, con-
sult and cooperate with organisations representing its em-
ployees.
e) When the necessity for the closure of factories or the laying
off of redundant employees becomes apparent, should give
adequate advance information, and in consultation with the
employees, arrange the timing and conditions of such action
in a way that will cause the minimum social damage.
f) Should, in fixing wage and salary levels, act as a good em-
ployer, participating constructively as a member of national
employers associations where these exist, and providing, ac-
cording to local circumstances, the best possible wages, so-
cial benefits, retirement provisions and working conditions
within the framework of the government's policies.
2. The Government of the Investor's Country
a) Should, in formulating policies aimed at securing full em-
ployment, rely on stimulating domestic demand through ap-
propriate economic and social policies, rather than on restric-
tions on the outflow of direct investment.
b) Should consider making available aid for education and
vocational training of local personnel in the skills needed by
the enterprise and elsewhere in the economy of the host
country, especially if it is a developing country.
3. The Government of the Host Country
a) Should seek, in co-operation with investors and with appro-
priate national and foreign organisations, to assess future
needs for skilled employees and to develop adequate pro-
grams for technical and managerial training.
b) Should permit the employment of qualified foreign person-
nel where this is needed for the efficient operation of the
enterprise or for training purposes.
As can be observed, these Guidelines are phrased in such a gen-
eral fashion and with so many qualifications that they scarcely
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meet the demands of labor. However, the above guidelines are
much more acceptable than the Preamble and Basic Principles of
the Pacific Basin Charter on International Investments adopted in
May, 1972, by the Pacific Basin Economic Committee. In this ef-
fort, the responsibilities of the investor to the worker are totally
ignored. Similarly, the principles for foreign investors issued
jointly by the Canadian and United States Chambers of Commerce
are concerned with labor only in the following obviously unsatis-
factory way.
In matters of personnel administration and industrial relations,
to conform with the practices and customs of the host country,
and to develop the skills and technical abilities of local staff.
Where control of a going concern is acquired, to refrain from
disturbing existing personnel relationships more than is necessary.
These few examples suggest that privately developed codes of
conduct are not going to offer the preciseness desired by trade
unions. Yet one cannot help but wonder whether an ILO code
will be much more satisfactory than that offered by the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce.
CONCLUSIONS
In the past, national trade union movements have successfully
appealed to the political process to achieve various social welfare
and employment goals. In most European countries, and to a some-
what lesser extent in the United States, many of labor's fringe and
similar social benefits have been obtained through governmental
action of some type. Furthermore, when labor unions needed a
powerful ally in their struggles with management, government
and the political process was frequently turned to. As a result, it
is perfectly understandable that trade unions would consider call-
ing upon government's regulatory powers to counteract the
strength and internationalism of multinational corporations.
However, the situation is quite different from the previous diffi-
culties with domestic firms. The international nature of the firm
means that a specific state government can only control, for the
most part, that portion of the corporate activity which occurs within
the boundaries of the state. The multinationalism of management
and the perception of benefits to be gained from foreign investment
by other states enables the corporation to be mobile and flexible.
Consequently, host state attempts to regulate corporate behavior on
union matters may be undercut by the willingness of other coun-
tries to offer the firm a more attractive investment climate. Thus,
host state regulation is relatively feasible but it also may backfire
to the detriment of domestic employment.
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Parent state regulation is another feasible mechanism, but at
this point the major capital exporting countries, especially the
United States, do not appear motivated to impose restrictions as
Sweden has done on a limited basis. Perhaps if this could be
achieved through agreement by the parent states, such as the OECD,
effective regulation from the perspective of labor could be achieved.
Given the interests of these states at this time, this alternative does
not have much immediate likelihood.
Regulation or the establishment of codes of conduct by regional
organizations may be possible in a rather energetic and fervent
group such as the Andean common market, but the overly bureauc-
ratized and rather cautious European Economic Community may
take quite some time before enacting such laws. A flagrant ex-
ample of multinational corporation insensitivity or abuse might gal-
vanize the Community into action, but otherwise it promises to be
a very slow process.
At the international level, trade unions have the difficulty of not
having a powerful and well-accepted international organization
with authority in these matters. The ILO is a slow-moving and
necessarily conservative organization which has perhaps moral
suasion power but little else other than its ability to direct attention
to a particular issue. Other international organizations, both govern-
mental and non-governmental, are not likely candidates for estab-
lishing a meaningful set of principles or regulations for multina-
tional corporations in their relations with trade unions and workers.
While a few states may enact such regulations and there may be
attempts at the regional or international level to act similarly, I do
not think labor union officials should or do put much reliance on
these efforts. It is my firm conviction, shared by a number of na-
tional and international union officials, that, while regulations may
be helpful, the unions themselves, through old and particularly
through emerging relationships, must develop their own counter-
strategies to the power of the multinational corporations.
